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Abstract We include endogenous differential information in a model with sequen-
tial trade and incomplete financial participation. Agents update information through
market signals given by commodity prices and asset deliveries. Information acts over
admissible strategies and consumption tastes, allowing discontinuities in preferences
and choice sets. Therefore, equilibrium may cease to exist. However, internalizing the
compatibility between information and consumption through preferences, andwithout
requiring either financial survival assumptions or fully revealing prices, equilibrium
existence can be ensured.
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1 Introduction
There exists a large literature on competitive equilibriumwith asymmetric information,
a framework introduced by Radner (1968) who extended the classical general equilib-
rium model by assuming that agents have incomplete and asymmetric information on
the future states of nature. In Radner’s (1968) model, agents are not able to improve
their initial private information, and the model requires information to be consistent
with agents’ allocations. This is a strong restriction since it is natural to assume that
market signals, summarized by future commodity prices, allow agents to update their
initial information. Alternatives to this model were studied in further developments,
as for instance Radner (1979), who considered beliefs on the future states of nature
and showed the existence of rational expectations equilibrium when full-informative
prices update agent’s initial information (generic equilibrium existence).
Meanwhile, financial imperfections that emerge from regulatory considerations,
lack of information or credit risk, induce financial participation constraints. With the
aim of studying these situations, the general equilibriummodel of incomplete financial
markets was extended to scenarios where agents have personalized access to financial
opportunities. See, for instance, the pioneering work of Cass (2006) or more recent
developments by Cornet and Gopalan (2010), Aouani and Cornet (2009, 2011), and
Cornet and Ranjan (2011).
Our aim is to elaborate in this framework, which departs from the model of incom-
plete markets with numéraire assets and differential information, in two ways: by
considering investment constraints, in contrast to the usual credit restrictions, and
allowing an endogenous update of agent’s private information. On the one hand, when
there is restricted participation in financial markets, for instance due to the lack of
information, there is no reason to block the access to the missing information that may
be available.1 Consequently, we will take into account the endogenous information
given by market’s signals. On the other hand, the fact of incorporating the information
given by asset returns avoids inconsistencies between the pattern of financial promises
and agents’ actions that may arise due to asymmetries on agents’ initial information
(see Example 6).
As inDubey et al. (1987), we assume that economic activity takes place sequentially
in a frame of time which, for the sake of simplicity, is summarized in two periods.
Initially, agents act according to their private information. This produces economic
outcomes that could benefit agentswith finer information. In this initial period, and due
to the lack of information, some group of agents create assets that could avoid some of
1 Faias and Moreno-García (2010) analyze the properties of a noninformative equilibrium price in the
context of real assets.
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the restrictions that appear in some models like Radner (1968).2 Indeed, we maintain
the scenario of incomplete financial participation. Thus, the asset deliveries update the
involved agents’ initial information. Additionally, in the first period, individuals are
restricted to trade in a subset of the financial market which is compatible with their
own—already updated—information and some agents could benefit again from their
finer information. Once the assets are present in the market, agents forecast future
commodity prices which eventually reveal additional information on the future states
of nature. Thus, each agent’s final information is the result of the update of her initial
private information firstly, by the signals given by the initial economic activity and
asset returns, and secondly by market signals given by future spot prices.
Therefore, as in the classical model of rational expectations, Radner (1979), in
our model agents’ private information can be endogenously improved via market’s
signals. Thus, this framework reflects how agents demand consumption plans that are
compatible with their final information.3
However, we argue that the primitives of a real economy could be far from being
random. Indeed, due to homogeneity of agent’s endowments or tastes across states of
nature, randomness can be seriously reduced as a consequence of the lack of agents’
initial information and the restricted financial participation. Thismeans that in contrast
to Radner (1979), the set of nonfully revealing equilibrium prices could be nonnegli-
gible.
As our model explicitly gives room to nonfully revealing prices, we could have lack
of continuity of the choice set correspondence due to the fact that agents eventually
learn additional information from partially revealing equilibrium prices (see Remark 1
in Sect. 3). This informational discontinuity was already observed by several authors
[see Radner (1967) for instance]. In order to overcome this lack of continuity,4 some
additional assumptions are needed. For it, when expected utility is considered, we con-
template the situation in which individual’s state-dependent preferences may depend
on the information that spot commodity prices reveal. Although preferences are exoge-
nously given, contingent consumption can depend on the final information available,
which may depend on spot prices. Price-dependent preferences are studied in the work
by Pollak (1977) and, more recently, in Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-Beloso (2008)
for a model of preferences for lists of bundles. Indeed, even in the classical expected
utility case, agents’ objective functions depend on their information and consequently
are, in general, implicitly price dependent (we stress this point in Sect. 5).
In this scenario, we define an equilibrium with endogenous differential informa-
tion and restricted financial participation and showequilibriumexistence. The classical
scenario to analyze rational expectations equilibrium, i.e., expected utility, is included
in ourmodel. Thus, in order to apply our existence result to this case, it is sufficient that
2 For instance, the example of no-trade caused by the lack of information in Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-
Beloso (2009) does not apply if the obvious assets were to be considered.
3 Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-Beloso (2009) showed that compatibility between consumption and infor-
mation can be endogenized also in another framework, allowing uncertain delivery of commodities and
provided that individuals have prudent expectations on market deliveries.
4 Without financialmarkets,DeCastro et al. (2014) introduce themaximin rational expectations equilibrium
(MREE) and provide not a generic proof of existence, as Radner (1979), but a universal one as in our work.
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the agent’s state-dependent preferences are similar across indistinguishable states with
respect to the final information. Nevertheless, our result only requires a more general
property in objective functions (see Assumption A). In addition, it is assumed that
information revealed by small differences in prices does not make dramatic changes
in the agent’s behavior. We may strengthen this assumption requiring that only sig-
nificative differences in prices produce changes on agent’s tastes. This argument is
consistent with preferences taking tendencies into account. As commodity prices are
channels to communicate information, differences in prices could be interpreted as
signals of how strong a tendency is realized, i.e., the consumption of a commodity is
more exclusive in a state where the price is significantly higher.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows: In Sect. 2 we introduce the
model, and in Sect. 3 we discuss the possibility of making information endogenously
compatible. Our main result and a nonexistence example are stated in Sect. 4. We
also provide an example that recaptures equilibrium existence when the continuity
assumption is satisfied. In Sect. 5 we focus on the expected utility model. We discuss
some additional examples in Sect. 6, and finally we conclude with some remarks. The
proof of the main result is contained in an “Appendix.”
2 A financial model with endogenous differential information
Consider a two period economy without uncertainty in the first period, t = 0, and
where one state of nature of a finite set S is realized in the second period, t = 1. Thus,
let S∗ = {0} ∪ S be the set of states of nature in the economy, identifying s = 0 as
the only state of nature in the first period. There is a finite set L of perfect divisible
and nonstorable commodities that may be traded at each period in spot markets. We
implicitly assume that there are many more states of nature than commodities.5
Let ps = (ps,l; l ∈ L) be the vector of commodity prices at state of nature s ∈ S∗
and p = (ps; s ∈ S∗) the set of commodity prices in the economy. Hereinafter, we fix
a bundle ζ ∈ RL++ and normalize unitary prices in such form that ps · ζ = 1,∀s ∈ S∗.
Let Pζ := {p ∈ RL+ : p · ζ = 1}. Thus, the set of commodity prices will be
P := {(ps; s ∈ S∗) ∈ RL×S∗+ : ps ∈ Pζ , ∀s ∈ S∗}.
There is a finite set J of numéraire assets indexed to the bundle ζ .6 Each asset j ∈ J
is issued at the first period, has a unitary price q j , and makes promises contingent to
the states of nature,
(
Rs, j ζ ; s ∈ S
) ∈ RL×S+ \ {0}. Let q := (q j ; j ∈ J ) ∈ RJ+.
There is a finite set of agents, denoted by I . Each individual i ∈ I may have
incomplete information about the realization of the uncertainty, as she only distin-
guishes states of nature that are in different elements of a partition Pi of S, which
constitutes her initial private information. Endowments of agent i are given by a
5 The requirement of more states of nature than commodities is not relevant in this work since our results
do not depend on it. However, Correia-da-Silva and Hervés-Beloso (2014) showed that allowing agents to
also trade ex-post in spot markets, generically, the informational asymmetries become irrelevant if there
are at least as many commodities as states of nature. See also Correia-da-Silva (2015).
6 Note that we require the bundle ζ to have strictly positive coordinates, whereas the general case of
numéraire assets allows for nonnegatives coordinates. This normalization is standard in the case of just one
commodity in each state.
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bundle wi = (wis; s ∈ S∗) ∈ RL×S
∗
++ whose restriction to coordinate in S denoted
wi|S := (wis; s ∈ S) is Pi -measurable.7 The only channel that individuals have to
improve their private information is through market signals that are commodity prices
and asset deliveries.
Participation in investment clubs or personalized loan scenarios are captured by
the fact that individuals may have limited access to financial contracts. Thus, agent
i can trade assets in a subset J i ⊆ J . We assume that asset returns are signals that
may be used to update information before the trade takes place. Thus, for each i ∈ I ,
the partition Pi incorporates all the information generated by the return of assets in
J i . That is, for any j ∈ J i , the vector (Rs, j ; s ∈ S) is Pi -measurable. In addition,
although thefinancial participation canbe incomplete, any contract j ∈ J canbe traded
for at least one agent. That is, J = ⋃i∈I J i .8 We also assume that the information
required to recognize the realization of the uncertainty can be obtained by the pooling
of individuals information, i.e.,
∨
i∈I Pi = {{s}; s ∈ S}.9
The financial access each agent has is given by nonredundant assets. That is, for each
i ∈ I the family of vectors {(Rs, j )s∈S : j ∈ J i } is linearly independent. Therefore, we
allow redundancy in themarket at an aggregate level—e.g., financial intermediation—
but there is no redundancywhenwe consider the individual access to financialmarkets.
We assume that the new information available could affect individuals’ beliefs about
the occurrence of states of nature and their tastes about contingent consumption. The
process of adapting agent’s private information happens at the same time that each
agent adapts her individual preference. Given prices p ∈ P , let τ(p) be the partition
of S generated by commodity prices in the second period p|S := (ps; s ∈ S). Then,
the final private information of agent i is given by the partition Pi ∨ τ(p). Thus,
individual preferences may depend endogenously on the information transmitted by
commodity prices. Therefore, each agent i ∈ I has a price-dependent utility function
V i : P × RL×S∗+ → R.
Each agent i ∈ I selects her consumption by choosing an informational and bud-
getary compatible allocation (xis; s ∈ S∗) ∈ RL×S
∗
+ , implemented through a financial
position θ i = (θ ij ; j ∈ J i ) ∈ RJ
i
. More precisely, given prices (p, q) ∈ P × RJ+,
the objective of an agent i ∈ I is to maximize her objective function V i by choosing
a consumption vector and a portfolio in her choice set, defined as the collection of
vectors (xi , θ i ) ∈ Ei := RL×S∗+ ×RJ i such that (xis; s ∈ S) is Pi ∨τ(p) -measurable,
and
7 Given a partition P of S, a vector (vs ; s ∈ S) is P-measurable if vs = vs′ for any pair of states of nature
s and s′ which belongs to the same element of the partition P.
8 Notice that as in Seghir (2011) we do not impose any kind of financial survival assumption. That is, we
do not assume that each agent has access to some amount of credit through any asset j ∈ J .
9 Since preferences will endogenize the information compatibility requirement (see Assumption A below),
we do not need to assume that for any s ∈ S there is i ∈ I that distinguishes it, i.e., {s} ∈ Pi . This is a
traditional assumption on static general equilibrium models with differential information, and it is used to
ensure that (under monotonicity of preferences) the equilibrium price of any contingent commodity contract
is strictly positive.
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j , ∀s ∈ S.
The collection of (xi , θ i ) ∈ Ei satisfying the budget constraints above is denoted
by Bi (p, q), while the collection of vectors (xi , θ i ) ∈ Ei for which (xis; s ∈ S) is
P
i ∨ τ(p)-measurable is denoted by I i (p). Therefore, given (p, q) ∈ P × RJ+, the
choice set of agent i ∈ I is Bi (p, q) ∩ I i (p).
Definition 1 An equilibrium with endogenous differential information and restricted
financial participation is given by prices (p, q) ∈ P × RJ+, allocations and portfolios(
(xi , θ
i
); i ∈ I
)
∈ ∏i∈I Ei such that





∈ Ei maximizes the utility function V i (p, ·) among
the allocations in the choice set Bi (p, q) ∩ I i (p).











j = 0, ∀ j ∈ J,
where, for any asset j ∈ J , I ( j) := {i ∈ I : j ∈ J i }.
3 Endogenously compatible information
As it was mentioned above, when agents self-restrict their consumption decisions
to those that are informational compatible, the presence of endogenous information
compromises the continuity of individuals’ choice set correspondence and equilibrium
may fail to exist. Following, we will illustrate the difficulties that may appear in order
to ensure equilibrium existence in a model with endogenous differential information
and where agents’ consumption plans are restricted by the availability of information.
Remark 1 Note that the choice set correspondence does not have a closed graph. Fix an
agent i ∈ I that is not fully informed (i.e., Pi = {{s}; s ∈ S}), and consider a sequence
of commodity prices {pn}n≥1 ⊂ P that converges to p. Assume that there is a partition
Q strictly finer than Pi ∨ τ(p) such that Q = ∧n≥1Qn where Qn := Pi ∨ τ(pn) for
any n ≥ 1.
Let θ i = 0 and xi = (wi0, (αswis; s ∈ S)), where (αs; s ∈ S) ∈ (0, 1)S is Q-
measurable but not Pi -measurable. Then, independently of q ∈ RJ+, the plan (xi , θ i )
belongs to Bi (pn, q) ∩ I i (pn), for any n ≥ 1. However, (xi , θ i ) /∈ Bi (p, q) ∩ I i (p),
since this plan is only Q-measurable. 
Observe that we only assume that agent i is not fully informed. In that case, there
are prices p such that Pi ∨ τ(p) = {{s}; s ∈ S} and sequences of full-informative
commodity prices {pn}n≥1 ⊂ P that converges to p.
Nevertheless, a regularity condition onpreferences that ensures individuals’ optimal
decisions to be compatiblewith the final information allows to recover the closed graph
property of choice sets, avoiding the informational compatibility restriction.
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Given (i, p) ∈ I × P , let S i (p) = {a : S → S : a is bijective and a(s) ∈
Ais(p), ∀s ∈ S}, where Ais(p) is the element of Pi ∨ τ(p) that contains the state of
nature s. Next, we elaborate on agent i’s behavior when there is no full information.
Note that if the states of nature s and s′ are in Ais(p), then by definition ps = ps′ ,
and prices do not give new information to agent i in order to update her preferences.
Individuals take optimal decisions regarding all the information available about the
realization of the uncertainty. Let p ∈ P be the price system and Pi (s) the initial
information of agent i ∈ I with respect to state s. The information revealed by prices
p is uninformative with respect to the event Pi (s), if and only if Pi (s) = Ais(p),
that is ps = ps′ for all s′ ∈ Pi (s). In this situation, agent i does not possess any
information to distinguish among states in Pi (s). With more generality, agent i is not
fully informed when Ais(p) = {s}, that is, she is unable to distinguish different states
in Ais(p).
The following assumption states that agent i ∈ I , being unable to distinguish
among states s and s′, is indifferent between consuming xs in state s and x ′s in state
s′ or consuming xs in state s′ and x ′s in state s. Moreover, the assumption ensures that
even if an agent may demand any kind of consumption plan in her budget set, at the
optimum, her choice will be measurable with respect to her final information. Notice
that this assumption is irrelevant when prices are fully informative.
Assumption A For any agent i ∈ I , the objective function V i : P × RL×S∗+ → R
satisfies: ∀p ∈ P, ∀(xis)s∈S∗ ∈ RL×S
∗


















The argument behind Assumption A states that it is not possible for agent i to value
differently the same consumption bundle in indistinguishable states. The next result
formalizes our arguments.
Proposition 1 Given prices (p, q) ∈ P ×RJ+, suppose that ((xis)s∈S∗ , θ i ) ∈ Ei is an
optimal choice for agent i ∈ I in her budget set Bi (p, q). If Assumption A holds, and
V i is strictly quasi-concave on consumption, then (xis)s∈S belongs to I i (p).
Proof Suppose that states of nature s and s′ are in the same element of Pi ∨ τ(p)
and that xis = xis′ . Since p ∈ P , we have that ps = ps′ . Moreover, as Pi contains
the information revealed by the payments of assets in J i , pswis +
∑
j∈J i Rs, jθ ij =
ps′wis′ +
∑
j∈J i Rs′, jθ ij . Fix λ ∈ (0, 1). It follows that λxis + (1 − λ)xis′ is budget
feasible at both states of nature, s and s′.
Define zi := (zik)k∈S ∈ RL×S+ by zik = xik when k /∈ {s, s′}, zis = zis′ = λxis + (1 −
λ)xis′ . In addition, consider the bijection ã : S → S such that ã(s) = s′, ã(s′) = s,
and ã(k) = k for any k /∈ {s, s′}. Since V i (p, xi0, (xik)k∈S




















. Therefore, agent i can improve her utility level choosing the
bundle zi . A contradiction. 
123
58 S. Cea-Echenique et al.
The following examples provide configurations where Assumption A is satisfied.
Example 1 Suppose for i ∈ I that there is a state-dependent utility function uis :
P × RL+ × RL+ → R for each s ∈ S and νi : P × 2S → [0, 1]. Denote the set of all
monotone set-valued functions on S by ∇, and for a finite ∇′ ⊂ ∇, define




νi (p, s) · uis(p, x0, xs).
In this configuration at given prices p ∈ P , Assumption A is fulfilled if the weights
ν(p, s′) and state-dependent utility functions coincide across indistinguishable states
s′ ∈ Ais(p).10 Note that expected utility is a particular case of this setting when ∇′
contains only one element being a probability measure on S. 
Example 2 Observe that Assumption A holds for the Cobb–Douglas objective func-
tion. For instance, for i ∈ I , let




#(L∪S) log(x0,l xs,l), where αl : Pζ → (0, 1) for each
l ∈ L .
(b) V i (p, x) = ∑s∈S αs#S log
(∑
l∈L x0,l + xs,l
)
, where (αs; s ∈ S) ∈ (0, 1)S .
We highlight that AssumptionA isweaker than requiring a condition ofmeasurabil-
ity in state-dependent preferences. For it, in Example 2(a) if we define us(p, x0, xs) =∑
l∈L
αl (ps )
#L log(x0,l xs,l), then we can write V
i (p, x) as an expected utility form. Pre-
cisely, assuming that states are equiprobable, then V i (p, x) = 1#S
∑
s∈S us(p, x0, xs).
Thus, in this case state-dependent utility functions are measurable with respect to the
final information. On the other hand, state-dependent utility functionsmay not bemea-
surable with respect to final information and still satisfy Assumption A. For instance,
in Example 2(b) if (αs; s ∈ S) is not measurable with respect to Pi ∨ τ(p) if the
prevailing prices are p.
4 Equilibrium existence
In order to state equilibrium existence, we concentrate in a model that also satisfies
the hypotheses B and C that are described below.
When price dependence is considered in the utility function, continuity in prices
is a standard assumption (see footnote 7). Nevertheless, changes on the information
revealed by pricesmay induce discontinuities on the objective functionV i . To illustrate
this possibility, next example sets an economy that fulfillsAssumptionA, and however,
equilibrium fails to exist since there is an agent for whom improving her information
matters.
10 State-dependent utility functions are measurable with respect to private information if the vector
(us (·, ·, ·)); s ∈ S) is Pi -measurable. Thus, this measurability condition gives no room to preference
update if for given p ∈ P the partition Pi ∨ τ(p) is finer than Pi . In Einy et al. (2000, 2001) it is assumed
that state-dependent utilities are equal across states that are indistinguishable with respect to the initial
information. Thus, Assumption A is fulfilled for every price. Furthermore, note that Assumption A does
not impose an expected utility framework.
123
Endogenous differential information 59
Example 3 (Nonexistence of Equilibria) Consider an economy with two periods and
two states of nature at the second period {s, s′}. There are two agents {A, B} and two
commodities {x, y}. Let (wAs , wAs′ ) = ((3, 1), (1, 1)) and (wBs , wBs′ ) = ((1, 1), (1, 1))
be the initial endowments. Without loss of generality, we pay particular attention to
commodity prices (ps, ps′)  0 satisfying ps,x + ps,y = 1 and ps′,x + ps′,y = 1
(i.e., we assume that ζ = (1, 1)).
Agent A initially recognizes the state of nature realized at t = 1 and maximizes
the following function 0.5xs ys + 0.5xs′ ys′ .
Agent B does not have information to recognize the state of nature at the second
period, i.e., PB = {{s, s′}}. She maximizes the function
1
2
min{xs, ys} + 1
2
min{xs′ , ys′ },






Since state-dependent utility functions of agent B are equal when prices are nonin-
formative, Assumption A is satisfied.
Bymonotonicity of preferences, if there are equilibriumprices, then they are strictly
positive. Furthermore, for (ps, ps′)  0 and with abuse of notation taking ps =
ps,x/ps,y ,11 the demands for commodities at prices satisfy
[
(x As , y
A




















(x Bs , y
B



















, ps = ps′ .
If there is an equilibrium in this economy, then we have:
(i) Equilibrium prices satisfy ps = ps′ .
Summing up demands of commodity x in state s and equaling it to the aggregate
endowment, we get that ps = 1. Replicating the procedure for state s′, we arrive to
the conclusion that ps′ = 1. A contradiction with the fact that prices are different.
(ii) Equilibrium prices satisfy ps = ps′ . From market clearing conditions, we get
ps = 13 as well as ps′ = 1. A contradiction with the fact that ps = ps′ . 
Thus, in order to obtain equilibrium existence, we assume continuity, local nonsa-
tiation, strict monotonicity, and strict quasi-concavity that are standard assumptions
in the literature.
Assumption B For any agent i ∈ I , the utility function V i is continuous on prices
and consumption, locally nonsatiated at each state s ∈ S∗ and strictly quasi-concave
11 Since demands are homogeneous in prices, this abuse of notation is without loss of generality.
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on consumption. Furthermore, for each (l, s) ∈ L × S∗, there is some i ∈ I such that
V i is strictly increasing in xs,l .12
Next, we give a particular example of the functional formof a state-dependent utility
function satisfying our assumptions. Particularly, we develop a generalized form of the
classic CES utility function such that the elasticity of substitution is not more constant,
but depends on prices. Here, we capture equilibrium existence for preferences given
in Example 3 if the uninformed agent only cares about price differences that are
significatively large. Note that the continuity required in Assumption B is not satisfied
in Example 3.
Example 4 (Price-dependent Elasticity of Substitution) Take the configuration of the
Example 3. Define a state-dependent utility with a CES form.13 That is, for each
k ∈ {s, s′}, let αk : P → [0, 1] be continuous and












if ε < ‖ps − ps′ ‖ < δ,
r(p) = −∞ if ‖ps − ps′ ‖ ≤ ε, and r(p) = 0 if ‖ps − ps′ ‖ ≥ δ. Replace the objective
function of agent B by the continuous function:















k∈{s,s′} uk(p, xk, yk) if ‖ps − ps′ ‖ ≥ δ
.
Therefore, when ‖ps − ps′ ‖ ≤ ε, then uk(p, xk, yk) becomes the function
min{xk, yk}, and if ‖ps − ps′ ‖ ≥ δ, then the state-dependent utility takes a
Cobb–Douglas form xαk (p)k y
1−αk (p)
k . We obtain the same objective function given
in Example 3 in the case prices are noninformative. Otherwise, we recover the
objective function of Agent B when differences in prices are sufficiently large, i.e.,
‖ps − ps′ ‖ ≥ δ and (αs(p), αs′(p)) = (1, 0.5).
When ε < ‖ps − ps′ ‖ < δ, demand functions are given by:
x Bs (p) = p
1
r(p)










, s ∈ {s, s′}
12 The local nonsatiation property at state s ∈ S∗ requires, for each (xik )k∈S∗ ∈ RL×S
∗
+ and ε > 0 the
existence of a bundle yis ∈ RL+ with ‖yis − xis‖ < ε and V i (p, (xik )k =s , yis ) > V i (p, (xi )k∈S∗ ) for every
p ∈ P .
13 The function g is a CES function, if there exist γ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1) such that
g(a, b) = (γ aρ + (1 − γ )bρ) 1ρ .
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Therefore, equilibrium equations are:
3ps + 1
2ps
+ x Bs (p) = 4;
ps′ + 1
2ps′
+ x Bs′ (p) = 2.
Which equilibrium is (ps, ps′) ≈ (1, 1.5) and demands are:
((x As (p), x
A
s′ (p)); (y As (p), y As′ (p))) = ((2, 0.8); (2, 1.25)) and
((x Bs (p), x
B
s′ (p)); (yBs (p), yBs′ (p))) ≈ ((2, 1.2); (0, 0.75). 
Incomplete participation in financialmarketsmakes difficult to normalize prices and
to ensure that budget set correspondences have a nonempty interior, at the same time.
For these reasons, and in order to find endogenous upper bounds on asset prices, it is
enough to impose Assumption C on the agents’ behavior, which states that a reduction
in future consumption (at t = 1) can be compensated by rising the consumption in the
first period (at t = 0).
Assumption C For any agent i ∈ I , given σ ∈ (0, 1) there is a continuous mapping
rσ : P × RL×S∗+ → RL+, that satisfies: ∀p ∈ P,∀(xs; s ∈ S∗) ∈ RL×S
∗
++ ,
V i (p, x0 + rσ (p, x), (σ xs; s ∈ S)) > V i (p, (xs; s ∈ S∗)).
Remark 2 Observe that the utility functions inExamples 2 and4 fulfillAssumptionsA,
B, and C. Also, the utility function in Example 1 satisfies Assumptions A–C if the
state-dependent utilities fulfill it. Assumption C is satisfied for a great variety of utility
functions. It is already satisfied by a monotone utility functions that is unbounded in
some commodity consumed in the first period (any Cobb–Douglas utility function or
the expected utility with state-dependent Cobb–Douglas preferences). 
In Seghir (2011), Assumption C is used to find upper bounds for asset prices;
however and in contrast to our model, in that paper they have restrictions on credit
opportunities only. Therefore, given restrictions on investment as well as on credit
opportunities, we find upper bounds on asset prices using this Assumption (see
Lemma 4 in the “Appendix”).
Theorem 1 Under Assumptions A, B and C, there exists an equilibrium for the econ-
omy with endogenous differential information and incomplete financial participation.
Proof See the “Appendix.” 
5 The expected utility
A particular configuration that is considered in our formulation for the objective
function is the expected utility. In order to illustrate our framework in this partic-
ular scenario, we assume that all states are equiprobable. Each agent i ∈ I has a utility
function, ũis : RL+ ×RL+ → R representing her preferences in each state s ∈ S. More-
over, if the financial structure is not considered, then our choice set, Bi (p, q)∩I i (p),
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incorporates the measurability condition and it has the standard configuration of ratio-
nal expectations equilibrium (REE).
Let p ∈ P be the prevailing price system. If p is fully informative, i.e., Ais(p) = {s}
for all s ∈ S, classical REE assumes agent i receives a utility ũis(x0, xs)when the state
of nature s is reached and the expected utility of agent i is given by14:






Alternatively, i.e., when Ais(p) = {s}, agent i evaluates her utility in state s as a
weighted average of the utilities across the states that are indistinguishable of s,






and computes her expected utility as follows:





· ui[s](p, x0, xs).
Thus, even when prices do not affect state-dependent preferences, prices are present
in each agent’s objective function as a consequence of the update of information. This
is because the contribution of the state s to the function V i is ũis , if prices are full
informative regarding the state of nature or ui[s] otherwise.
In order to accomplish Assumption A, we require additional hypothesis on state-
dependent utilities that are price (informational) dependent. Einy et al. (2000, 2001)
assume that state-dependent utilities (that do not depend on prices) are measurable
with respect to initial information. That is, for every price p ∈ P and state s′ ∈ Pi (s):
ui[s](p, ·, ·) := ũis′(·, ·).This assumption that implies AssumptionA and the continuity
of the objective function is restrictive since it precludes the possibility of utility update
when information matters. Indeed, note that in this configuration the weighted average
does not depend on prices.
With the aim to recover the possibility of utility update and ensuring the continuity
of the objective function, we will assume that (contrary to the Example 3 where it is
a discontinuous function of prices) state-dependent utility functions uis , s ∈ S, satisfy
Assumption B. Furthermore, our result requires expected utility fulfilling Assump-
tion A. For it, a sufficient requirement is that if p ∈ P is the prevailing price and
s′ ∈ Ais(p), then uis(p, x0, xs) = uis′(p, x0, xs), that is, final information measur-
ability. Nevertheless, as in Example 2(b) for state-dependent utilities that are not
measurable with respect to final information, Assumption A is still satisfied.
Thus, when prices across states initially indistinguishable for agent i ∈ I add
new information, the state-dependent utility function is updated in a smooth way if
Assumption B is required. The assumption prevents the transition via the information
14 More generally, it is possible to consider beliefs about the realization of the uncertainty (see Example 2).
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revealed by prices from being abrupt, as in Example 3. That is, the smaller the differ-
ence in prices between initially indistinguishable states is, the closer the state utility
should be to the utility of the other indistinguished states [see Examples 2(a) and 4].
We may strengthen the argument assuming that there is an ε > 0 such that
uis(p, x0, ·) and uis′(p, x0, ·) for s′ ∈ Pi (s) are equal when maxs′∈Pi (s) ‖ps − ps′ ‖ ≤ ε
(Example 4 illustrates this possibility). This case represents an scenario where ε-
differences in prices do not affect at all the state utility. In other words, an ε > 0
can be understood as the personalized threshold from which the agent subjectively
differentiates her preferences across indistinguishable states. Observe that if ε is big
enough, we fall in the case where the state utility functions are not price dependent,
as in Einy et al. (2000, 2001).
6 Other examples
The following examples offer some insights about price informativeness and infor-
mation compatibility captured in the model. First, we elaborate on nonfully revealing
prices. Second, we illustrate the relation between the initial information and the infor-
mation revealed by the asset that are accessible.
Example 5 (Noninformative equilibrium) Consider an economy with two commodi-
ties and utility functions given by








, ∀i ∈ I,
where β ∈ (0, 1) is the same for all agents. Then, Assumptions A, B, and C hold (see
Remark 2). Also, first-order conditions of consumer’s i problem at state s ∈ S would








where Ws,l = ∑i∈I wis,l . Suppose that there is an uninformed agent i0 ∈ I (i.e.,
P
i0 = {S}). Then, equilibrium prices are noninformative if, and only if, the relative
degree of commodity scarcity is constant at the second period, Ws,2Ws,1 =
Ws′,2
Ws′,1
, ∀(s, s′) ∈
S × S, which is a restrictive hypothesis and it is also associated with the absence
of aggregated uncertainty.15 Thus, for any economy in which this condition does
not hold, any equilibrium price will reveal information (at least for the uninformed
agent i0). 
The following proposition illustrates examples of our model in which the equilib-
rium prices are, at least, partially informative. That is, at given prices p ∈ P , the
partition Pi ∨ τ(p) is finer than Pi . For robust partially revealing examples including
ambiguity, see Condie and Ganguli (2011).
15 We thank an anonymous referee for pointing out this concept.
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Proposition 2 Under Assumptions A to C, assume that there are two commodities l
and l ′ such that the preferences of any agent i ∈ I can be represented by a utility
function




i (p, xi0, (x
i





where vi is differentiable and g : R+ × R+ → R is a CES function. In addition,
suppose that the relative scarcity of commodities l and l ′ differs across states of nature









Then, in any equilibrium commodity prices are at least partially informative.
Proof By Contradiction, assume that equilibrium prices are noninformative. There-
fore, for states of nature s and s′, we have ps = ps′ . Since g is a CES function, there
exist γ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ∈ (−∞, 0) ∪ (0, 1) such that g(a, b) = (γ aρ + (1 − γ )bρ) 1ρ .
The marginal rate of substitution between the consumption of commodities l and l ′ at






ρ−1 . Thus, Karush–Kuhn–Tucker conditions of
agent i’s individual problem guarantee that
xik,l =
(



















wik,l ′ , k ∈ {s, s′}.
Therefore, as ps = ps′ , the relative scarcity of commodities l and l ′ coincides at nodes
s and s′, which contradicts our initial assumption. 
Example 6 In this example, we will illustrate the importance of the compatibility
between the initial information and the information revealed by the asset that an agent
can trade. For the sake of simplicity, consider an economy with only one commod-
ity, three states of nature at t = 1, denoted by {u, m, d}, and two agents who only
receive utility for consumption in the second period. Also, they do not have any initial
endowment at t = 0.16 Thus, utility functions and endowments are given by
16 In order to formally cover configurations without commodity-trading markets in the first period, it is
sufficient to include a state dependency in the set of commodities L . More precisely, suppose that there
is a set of commodities Ls for each state s ∈ S∗. Under this configuration, Example 6 requires L0 = ∅
inducing no essential changes in our results.
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xu + √xm + √xd , (w1u, w1m, w1d) = (3, 3, 3);










d) = (3, 3, 3).
There are two Arrow securities in the economy. One of them has a unitary price q1
and promises to deliver one unit of the commodity at state of nature s = u. The other
makes a contingent payment of one unit of the commodity at s = d and is negotiated
for a unitary price q2.
If there is a complete financial participation, the first period budget constraint of
agent i ∈ {1, 2} is given by q1zi1 + q2zi2 = 0, where zij denotes the position of agent
i on asset j ∈ {1, 2}.









d) = (1,−1, 4, 3, 2), (z21, z22, x2u , x2m, x2d ) = (−1, 1, 2, 3, 4).
constitute an equilibrium for the economy.
We argue that if agents are not fully informed—that is, they do not internalize
the information revealed by asset payments—the implementation of this equilibrium
allocation may not be credible. For instance, assume that P1 = {{u}, {m, d}} and
P
2 = {{u, m}, {d}}. In order to pay her debt, it is required that agent i = 1 observes
that the state of nature s = d was realized. This would be impossible to accomplish
as commodity prices do not communicate information, and there is no other financial
signal which allows recognition between states m and d. Analogously, to pay her
debt, it is required that agent i = 2 observes some signal that allows her to distinguish
between u and m, which is an impossible task to accomplish given the financial
structure. 
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we elaborate on a model of competitive market with differential infor-
mation, where agents have restricted participation in incomplete financial markets.
Agents, sequentially, are able to add new information from the traded assets, buy
commodities in spot markets, and receive the signals given by spot prices allowing
them to improve their previous private information.
Our model allows agents to obtain information through the variability of payments
in financialmarkets. Thus, individuals obtain all the information revealed by the aware-
ness conveyed by securities that they can trade. However, there is an incomplete access
to financial instruments available in the economy. In order to be consistent with the
information transmitted by asset returns and the restrictions that imply the incom-
plete access to investment opportunities, we ensure that equilibrium exists without the
requirement of any kind of financial survival restriction.
We contemplate a scenario where the agents’ final information about the realiza-
tion of uncertainty needs not to be fully revealing. In our model, the final information
may have real effects over the agent’s capability to implement heterogeneous pref-
erences across states of nature. Equilibrium existence is obtained without imposing
any additional compatibility requirement between consumption and information. The
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measurability of optimal bundles is a consequence of the informational-dependent
nature of individuals objective functions, since there are no gains for consumption
heterogeneity in states of nature that are indistinguishable.
Appendix: Proof of Theorem 1
To prove equilibrium existence, we first define a generalized game in which agents
maximize utility functions in truncated budget sets. Auctioneers choose prices in order
tomaximize the value of the excess of demand in commodity andfinancialmarkets.We
prove that this generalized game has a Cournot–Nash equilibrium and also that when
the upper bounds on allocations are high enough, any equilibrium of the generalized
game will be an equilibrium of our economy.
The generalized game G (Q, X,Θ) . Given any vector (Q, X,Θ) ∈ R3++, we define
a game characterized by the following set of players and strategies.
Set of players. There is a finite set of players constituted by
(i) The set of agents of the economy, I .
(ii) An auctioneer, h(s), for each s ∈ S∗.
We denote the set of players by H = I ∪ H(S∗) where H(S∗) := {h(s) : s ∈ S∗}.
Sets of strategies. Given W := max
(s,l)∈S∗×L
∑
i∈I wis,l , define for any i ∈ I ,
K i (X,Θ) = [0, X ]L × [0, 2W ]S×L × [−Θ,Θ]J i ,
and recall Pζ = {p ∈ RL+ : p · ζ = 1}. The set of strategies for the players in the
generalized game, (Γ
h; h ∈ H), are given by,
(i) For each h ∈ I , Γ h = K h(X,Θ).
(ii) For h = h(0), Γ h = Pζ × [0, Q]#J
(iii) For h = h(s), with s ∈ S, Γ h = Pζ .
For simplicity, let ηh = (xh, θh) ∈ Γ h be a generic vector of strategies for a player
h ∈ I ; (p0, q) will denote a generic strategy for the player h(0); and ps a generic
strategy for a player h(s), with s ∈ S. Finally, let Γ = ∏h∈H Γ h be the space of
strategies of G (Q, X,Θ) . A generic element of Γ is denoted by (p, q, η), where
η := (ηh; h ∈ I ) is a generic element of ∏i∈I Γ i .
Admissible strategies. Strategies effectively chosen for players depend on the actions
taken by other players, through a correspondence of admissible strategiesφh : Γ −h 
Γ
h
, where Γ −h = ∏h′ =h Γ h
′
. Let (p, q, η)−h be a generic element of Γ −h . We
suppose that
(i) If h ∈ I , φh [(p, q, η)−h
] = Bh(p, q) ∩ Γ h .
(ii) If h ∈ H(S∗), φh [(p, q, η)−h
] = Γ h .
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Objective functions. Each player is also characterized by an objective function Fh :
Γ
h × Γ −h → R+. We assume that
(i) When h ∈ I and ηh = (xh, θh) ∈ Γ h , then Fh (ηh; (p, q, η)−h
) = V i (p, xh) .
(ii) If h = h(0) and (p0, q) ∈ Γ h , then
Fh
(















(iii) If h(s) ∈ H(S∗) \ {h(0)} and ps ∈ Γ h , then Fh
(




















y; (p, q, η)−h
)
.
Finally, let Ψ : Γ  Γ be the correspondence of optimal game response, which is





Definition 2 A Cournot–Nash equilibrium for the generalized game G (Q, X,Θ) is
given by a strategy profile (p, q, η) ∈ Γ such that (p, q, η) ∈ Ψ (p, q, η).
In order to prove the existence of equilibrium in the generalized game, we need
some properties of the admissible strategy correspondence which the following lemma
provides.
Lemma 1 For any h ∈ H, φh is continuous and has nonempty, compact, and convex
values.
Proof For each player h ∈ H(S∗), the correspondence of admissible strategies is
constant and, therefore, it is continuous and nonempty. Also, by definition, its values
are compact and convex.
On the other hand, for each player h ∈ I , it follows from the definition of the bud-
get set that the correspondence of admissible strategies φh has nonempty, compact,
and convex values. Since the graph of this correspondence is closed, we obtain upper
hemicontinuity. To assure the lower hemicontinuity of φh , we consider the correspon-
dence φ̊h ((p, q, η)−h) := intK h(X,Θ) Bh(p, q), which associates with a vector of
commodity and asset prices the set of allocations in K h(X,Θ) that satisfy all the
budget restrictions of agent h as strict inequalities. Note that this correspondence has
nonempty values and open graph. Therefore, it is lower hemicontinuous. We know
that the closure of φ̊h ((p, q, η)−h), which is equal to φh ((p, q, η)−h), is also lower
hemicontinuous. Therefore, correspondences of admissible strategies (φh; h ∈ I ) are
continuous. 
Lemma 2 Under (A) and (B), the set of Cournot–Nash equilibria of G (Q, X,Θ) is
nonempty.
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Proof By Assumption (A) and (B), each objective function in the game is continuous
in all variables and quasi-concave in its own strategy. Also, the sets of strategies are
nonempty, compact, and convex. By Lemma 1, admissible correspondence is con-
tinuous with nonempty, convex, and compact values. Thus, we can apply Berge’s
maximum theorem to assure that for each player h ∈ H , the correspondence of opti-
mal strategies, Ψ h , is upper hemicontinuous with nonempty, convex, and compact
values. Therefore, the correspondence Ψ has closed graph with nonempty, compact,
and convex values. Applying Kakutani’s fixed-point theorem to Ψ , we conclude the
proof.
We will prove that for vectors (Q, X,Θ) ∈ R3++ for which coordinates are high
enough, any equilibrium of the generalized game is an equilibrium for our economy.
However, we need to previously find endogenous upper bounds for equilibrium vari-
ables.
Lemma 3 For each (i, s) ∈ I × S, fix a vector (ps, wis, xis) ∈ Pζ × RL+ × RL+, with
xis < W . Then, there exists A > 0 such that any vector
(
κ ij ; j ∈ J i
)
∈ RJ i satisfying
ps x
i





j , ∀(i, s) ∈ I × S;
belongs to [−A, A]#J i . Also, A only depends on ((W , ws, Rs, j ); (s, j) ∈ S × J ).
Proof Fix i ∈ I . Note that as S (respectively, J ) is a finite set, by abusing of the
notation and identifying it with {1, . . . , S} (respectively, {1, . . . , J i }) we can rewrite































Since for i ∈ I there are no redundant assets in J i , we have that J i ≤ S. Moreover,
we can find a nonsingular submatrix of dimension J i × J i . Specifically, we may
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By Cramer’s Rule,
κ ij =
det (Bi (yi , j))
det(Bi )
, ∀ j ∈ {1, . . . , J i },
where yi = (p1(xi1−wi1), . . . , pJ (xiJ i −wiJ i )) and Bi (yi , j) is thematrix obtained by
change, in the matrix Bi , the j-ith column for the vector yi . Since (i) the determinant
is a continuous function, (ii) the vector yi depends continuously on ((ps, xis); s ∈ S),
and (iii) vectors ((ps, xis, w
i
s); s ∈ S) are in a compact space, it follows that vector
(kij ; j ∈ J i ) is bounded, independently of the value of ((ps, xis, wis); s ∈ S). Thus,
there exists A > 0, the maximum across the bounds of (kij ; j ∈ J i ) for each i ∈ I ,
which satisfies the conditions of the lemma and depends on ((W , ws, Rs, j ); (s, j) ∈
S × J ). 
Following the notation of the previous lemma, let Θ := 2A.
The next two lemmas are used to prove that equilibrium asset prices of the general-
ized game are uniformly bounded. For convenience of notations, let W0 = (W0,l; l ∈
L) be the vector of aggregated physical resources at t = 0, where W0,l := ∑i∈I wi0,l .
Lemma 4 Under Assumptions (B) and (C), fix (p, q) ∈ P ×RJ+ and suppose that for
any agent i ∈ I , there is an optimal solution (xi , θ i ) ∈ Γ i for his individual problem
such that xi0 ≤ W0 and xis,l ≤ 2W , ∀(s, l) ∈ S × L. Then, there exists Q > 0,
independent of prices, such that max
j∈J q j < Q.





2 > 0. Suppose that an agent i ∈ I for
which j ∈ J i borrows a quantity θ̃ j > 0 of asset j such that Rs, j θ̃ j ≤ μ, for any
s ∈ S.17 This position on asset j reports a quantity of resources which allow agent i
to consume at the first period the bundle wi0 + (q j θ̃ j )ζ and, therefore,
V i
(
p, wi0 + (q j θ̃ j )ζ, (0.5wis; s ∈ S)
)
≤V i (p, xi )<V i (p, W0, (2W (1, . . . , 1))s∈S
)
.




p, W0, (2W (1, . . . , 1))s∈S
)
< V i (p, wi0 + r(p), (0.5wis; s ∈ S)).
Indeed, following the notation of Assumption (C), the inequality above follows from
r(p) = r σ̃
(
p, (W0, (2W (1, . . . , 1))s∈S)
) + W0 − wi0 ∈ RL+,
where σ̃ ∈ (0, 1) is chosen to satisfy 2W σ̃ < μ.
17 Notice that by definition, θ̃ j depends only on primitive parameters of the economy (endowments and
unitary financial payments).
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We conclude that




Moreover, the upper bound Q j (p) is well defined for any p ∈ P , and it follows from
Assumption (C) that it varies continuously with commodity prices. Thus, the function
Q : P → R defined by Q(p) = max j∈J Q j (p) is continuous. Since P is compact,
we conclude that there exists Q > 0 such that max j∈J q j < Q. 
We define X = 2(1 + Q)W .
Note that for any X > X and Q > Q, in the associated generalized game
G (Q, X,Θ) any player h ∈ I may demand in the first period the bundle used in
the proof of Lemma 4. Thus, in this type of generalized game, the existence of an opti-
mal plan satisfying the conditions of lemma above will imply that the unitary prices
of assets are bounded from above by Q.
The existence of equilibria in our economy is a consequence of the following result.
Lemma 5 Under Assumptions (A), (B) and (C), if (Q, X,Θ)  (Q, X ,Θ), then









∈ Γ i , be a equilibrium for the
generalized game G (Q, X,Θ), with (Q, X,Θ)  (Q, X ,Θ).





















> 0, then the auctioneer h(0) will choose
the greater price for this good, pl = 1, and zero prices for the other goods and





i∈I wi0 < W0. Analogously, if
∑
i∈I ( j) θ
i
j > 0, then the
auctioneer h(0) would choose the maximum price possible for this asset, i.e., q j =
Q > Q, which is a contradiction with the result of Lemma 4. Thus, for any j ∈ J ,
∑
i∈I ( j) θ
i
j ≤ 0.
Since first period consumption is bounded from above by the aggregate endow-
ment, which is less than X , it follows that budget constraints at t = 0 are satisfied







< 0, the auctioneer h(0) would choose a zero price
for the good l, a contradiction with the strict monotonicity of preferences for some
i ∈ I (Assumption B). Therefore, ∑i∈I xi0 = W0. Furthermore, if
∑
i∈I ( j) θ
i
j < 0,
the auctioneer would choose q j = 0, a contradiction with the monotonicity of prefer-
ences. Then, market feasibility conditions hold at t = 0 in both physical and financial
markets.
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; i ∈ I
)
at t = 0, and aggregating budget





) ≤ 0. Therefore, analogous





) ≤ 0. This last property







< 0, then the auctioneer h(s)would choose a zero price
for the good l ∈ L , which contradicts individual optimality under strictly monotonic
preferences for some i ∈ I . We conclude that market feasibility also holds at each
state of nature s ∈ S.
Step II. Optimality of individual allocations. Since market feasibility holds in physical
markets, it follows that xi0,l < X and x
i
s,l < 2W , for any (i, s, l) ∈ I × S × L . Using
Lemma 3, we have that for any i ∈ I and j ∈ J i , |θ ij | < Θ . Thus, for any i ∈ I , ηi
belongs to the interior of K i (X,Θ).
Suppose that there exists another allocationηi ∈ RL×S∗+ ×RJ i such thatV i (p, ηi ) >
V i (p, ηi ). Since for λ ∈ (0, 1) sufficiently small, ηi (λ) := ληi + (1 − λ)ηi ∈
K i (X,Θ), the strictly concavity of V i (p, ·) implies that V i (p, ηi (λ)) > V i (p, ηi ), a
contradiction with the optimality of ηi ∈ Γ i . Therefore, for any ηi ∈ RL×S∗+ × RJ i ,
V i (p, ηi ) ≤ V i (p, ηi ), which proves the optimality of ηi ∈ Bi (p, q) among the allo-
cations in the agent i’s budget set. Notice that as was proved in Sect. 3, informational
compatibility of consumption allocations follows from Assumption (A). 
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